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SECURITY DEVICES
Thomas A. Harrell*
Suretyship
In Prime Time Television, Inc. v. Coastal Computer Systems, Inc.,'
the court properly rejected the argument that a contract of suretyship
cannot be confected until after the principal obligation arises. This
proposition occasionally has been advanced because Louisiana Civil Code
article 3035 defines suretyship as an accessory promise by which one
binds himself for "another already bound." Furthermore, the text of
the article was not found in the Code of 1808, but was added, without
comment, by the redactors of the Code of 1825, so that its antecedents
and purpose are not entirely clear.2
The Code of 1808 contained no definition of the contract of sur-
etyship, and the most likely explanation for the addition of article 3035
in 1825 is simply that the redactors intended to correct that omission.
The article obviously is a definition: it was inserted as the first article
in the Title, it adds nothing of substantial importance to the Code, and
every other title in the Code regulating a nominate contract contains
such a definition.
A comparison of article 3035 with other articles simultaneously
inserted by the redactors of the Code of 1825 further supports the
conclusion that the reference to one "already bound" serves only to
emphasize the accessory nature of the contract, rather than to establish
the rules regulating when and under what circumstances suretyship can
be established.' One such article is article 1764 4 which defines accessory
Copyright 1986, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
I. 484 So. 2d 780 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1986).
2. Professor Batiza suggests, in his work on the sources of the Code of 1825, that
the article was "substantially influenced" by Pothier. See Batiza, The Actual Sources of
the Louisiana Projet of 1823: A General Analytical Survey, 47 Tul. L. Rev. I, 100 (1972).
3. Professor Denis's observations concerning the definitions of pledge in the Louisiana
Civil Code are probably worth repeating in this context:
I do not propose to define the contract of pledge. There are already numerous
definitions of it. Many are defective; very few are instructive or useful. Defi-
nitions at best seldom convey information or knowledge, and they sometimes
create confusion. As the Latin maxim says: Omnia definitio in lege periculosa
est.
H. Denis, A Treatise on the Law of the Contract of Pledge 2 (1898).
4. Article 1771 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870.
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contracts "such as suretyship, mortgage and pledge" in terminology
similar to article 3035: "An accessory contract is made for assuring the
performance of a prior contract . . . ." Also adopted was article 3259,1
which expressly declares that a mortgage may be given for an obligation
"which has not yet risen into existence." The absence of comment by
the redactors to these additions indicates a lack of intention to work
any great change in the law, which before the Code clearly permitted
creation of contracts of suretyship and mortgage for future obligations. 6
The civil law has never experienced any theoretical difficulty in
creating security for future obligations. 7 Suretyship could be given for
such obligations under Roman law' and under the Spanish law prevailing
in Louisiana before the Code of 1808. 9 Furthermore, the Civil Code
provides that pledge and mortgage can be contracted for future obli-
gations.' 0 Despite all of this, support for an interpretation of article
5. Article 3292 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870.
6. As to suretyships, see infra note 9. As to mortgages, see Roussel v. Dukeylus'
Syndics, 4 Mart. (o.s.) 218 (La. 1816), approving the validity of a mortgage "to secure
the plaintiff, among other things, against future endorsements." Edward Livingston, one
of the 1825 redactors, was the attorney for the plaintiff in that case, and although it
cannot be established with certainty, the first clause of article 3292 appears to paraphrase
a section of Pothier relied upon by Livingston in his argument. Pothier declared: "One
can give a mortgage for a debt which is not yet contracted, but only to be contracted."
Pothier, des Hypotheques, sec. 3. The second clause of article 3292, providing, "as when
a man grants a mortgage by way of security for indorsements, which another promises
to make for him," seems to be taken directly from the Roussel case. It would be difficult
to support the proposition that Livingston, at least, saw any conceptual difficulties with
security created in anticipation of the principal obligation.
7. A similar question could be raised as to mortgage if the matter is limited solely
to the definitional articles. La. Civ. Code art. 3285 provides: "[lit is essentially necessary
to the existence of a mortgage, that there shall be a principal debt to serve as a foundation
for it." That this does not limit a mortgage to existing obligations is made clear by the
previously mentioned article 3292: "A mortgage may be given for an obligation which
has not yet risen into existence .... "
8. "A surety may bind himself either previously or subsequently to the contraction
of the obligation." Scott, Corpus Juris Civilis, The Civil law, Vol. 2, The Enactments
of Justinian, Title XX, Concerning Sureties, (3), 113. "Fideiussion ... was the sole
means of creating suretyship by stipulation in Justinian's time, and which must have
dated back at least to 81 B. C ..... Further, the main obligation . . might even be
guaranteed by anticipation." Pritchard, Leagues Roman Private Law 344 (3d ed. 1961).
9. "We may give security [suretyship) not only for a present obligation, or one
already contracted, but also for an obligation to be contracted . Part I, Book Ill,
Tit. IV, § 1, No. 1853 (1808).
10. La. Civ. Code arts. 3158, 3292. The priority of real security given under such
conditions vis-&-vis security created before the principal obligation arises is a different
question. It might also be noted that, if the creation of security for a debt not yet in
existence violates the "accessory nature" of security, so should the creation of security
over property not yet owned by the person creating the contract. There is no difficulty
with creating such security however. See La. Civ. Code arts. 3288, 3304.
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3035 that would preclude suretyship from arising until the debt is formed
has been found in the commonly stated proposition that an accessory
obligation cannot exist without a principal one." Such an interpretation
confuses the question of when a contract can be confected with the
questions of when and under what conditions its obligations can be
enforced. An accessory obligation obviously cannot be enforced in the
absence of a principal obligation (which is what statements concerning
the necessity for a principal obligation mean). Nevertheless, there is not,
and has never been, any doubt in the civil law that an accessory contract
can be made before the principal obligation arises, the creation of the
latter being merely a suspensive condition to the enforcement of the
former.' 2 In fact, the accessorial nature of contracts of security is nothing
more than a recognition that such contracts are given upon a particular
kind of suspensive condition that distinguishes them from "direct" or
"principal" obligations. The enforcement of every accessory obligation
is dependant upon the existence of another, unperformed obligation.
The accessory character of security was also at issue in Desonnier
v. Golden Gulf Marine Operators, Inc. '3 The plaintiff in that case entered
into an employment contract with the defendant corporation that was
guaranteed by the defendant's principal shareholders (one of whom was
also a defendant in the action). When the defendant corporation pre-
maturely terminated the contract, the plaintiff claimed that his discharge
was without cause and that Civil Code article 2749 permitted him to
collect his salary for the contract's remaining term. 4 The court concluded
that the discharge was in fact without just cause and awarded the plaintiff
the full amount of his unpaid salary in accordance with the article. The
contract contained a rather complicated compensation structure, one of
the items of which required the employer to pay certain premiums for
disability, life and health insurance. The court noted that article 2749
is penal in nature and limits the employee to collection only of his
unearned salary. It then rejected the employee's claim for future in-
surance premiums on the ground that they were not part of his "salary"
Ii. Compare La. Civ. Code arts. 3285 & 3292, supra note 7.
12. La. Civ. Code art. 1767: "A conditional obligation is one dependent upon an
uncertain event. If the obligation may not be enforced until the uncertain event occurs,
the condition is suspensive .... " La. Civ. Code art. 1775: "Fulfillment of a condition
has effects that are retroactive to the inception of the obligation .... It is also possible
to make an offer to form a suretyship contingent upon an acceptance by act of extending
the credit or agreeing to extend the credit to the debtor. The matter is one of contract,
not imperative law.
13. 474 So. 2d 1314 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985).
14. "If, without any serious ground of complaint, a man should send away a laborer
whose services he has hired for a certain time, before that time has expired, he shall be
bound to pay to such laborer the whole of the salaries which he would have been entitled
to receive, had the full term of his services arrived." La. Civ. Code art. 2749.
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within the meaning of article 2749. Nevertheless, the court held the
surety liable for those amounts, declaring: "The liability of the guarantor
differs from that of the company. The promise is to guarantee not only
payment but 'performance of all obligations of the Company under this
Agreement.' . . . Therefore, the judgment against [the guarantor] consists
of his virile share of salary, bonus, and life and health insurance."' 5
In effect, the court cast the surety for amounts that it held were
not owed by the principal obligor. This is clearly erroneous for several
reasons. First, it is contrary to Civil Code article 3037, which provides:
"The suretyship cannot exceed what may be due by the debtor, nor be
contracted under more onerous conditions .... The suretyship which
exceeds the debt or which is contracted under more onerous conditions
shall not be void, but shall be reduced to the conditions of the principal
obligation."' 6 Secondly, the surety is not an insurer. He is entitled to
recover what he pays the principal creditor from the debtor. He is thus
subrogated to the claim of the principal creditor and has a direct right
of indemnification against the debtor.' 7 More importantly, these rules
and the limitations of article 3037 flow from the essential nature of
suretyship as an accessory contract." It is given to guarantee performance
of the unfulfilled obligation of another. 9 The surety is released or
discharged to the extent the principal obligation is discharged and may
plead any defense to the principal obligation that the debtor may plead.2 0
Consequently, the law leaves no doubt whatsoever that an indispensable
allegation of a suit against a surety is that the debtor is indebted to
the plaintiff for the sum he seeks from the surety. To the extent the
court held the surety for more than the employer owed to the employee,
it distorted the purpose and misconstrued the nature of suretyship.
15. 474 So. 2d at 1319.
16. La. Civ. Code art. 3037.
17. La. Civ. Code art. 3052. "The surety may oppose to the creditor all exceptions
belonging to the principal debtor, and which are inherent in the debt . La. Civ.
Code art. 3060.
18. "A contract is accessory when it is made to provide security for the performance
of an obligation. Suretyship . .. [is an examplel . .. of such a contract." La. Civ. Code
art. 1913. "The obligation of the surety towards the creditor is to pay him in case the
debtor should not himself satisfy the debt .... " La. Civ. Code art. 3045.
19. There is little doubt of the nature of the guaranty in this case. Even though the
parties bound themselves solidarily "with the Company," they did so to "absolutely
guarantee to (the] Employee prompt and complete payment and performance of all
obligations of the Company under this Agreement." 474 So. 2d at 1315. If the judgment
sought against the guarantor cannot be obtained against the company, it is difficult to
see how it can be an obligation of the company under the contract, the performance of
which is guaranteed.
20. La. Civ. Code art. 3060.
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Hardware Wholesalers, Inc. v. Guilbeau1 illustrates a trap into which
owners of closely-held corporations (or their attorneys) may easily fall.
The defendants were the sole shareholders of a corporation engaged in
the retail hardware business. The plaintiff was a wholesale hardware
cooperative. As a prerequisite to the retail corporation purchasing mer-
chandise from the plaintiff, defendants were required to buy stock in
the plaintiff's cooperative and to guarantee the debts of the retailer.
The defendants later sold their interest in the retailer to their daughters
and sons-in-law. Defendants also transferred their stock in plaintiff's
cooperative to these purchasers, and thus the plaintiff apparently was
aware of the change in the ownership of the retail corporation. About
three years later, the retail corporation defaulted on its account to the
plaintiff. Plaintiff then demanded that the defendants pay the account
in accordance with their guaranty.
The defendants argued that they only intended to guarantee the
debts of the retail corporation while they were its owners. This, combined
with the plaintiff's awareness that they had sold all of their stock in
the retail corporation, claimed the defendants, terminated their liability
under the guaranty. Nevertheless, because the guaranty agreement ex-
pressly provided that it would continue until written notice of termination
was received from the guarantors, the court held that the contract
continued in full force and effect until such notice was given. The court
found the testimony of the defendants as to their intention to be ir-
relevant, absent a showing that such an intention was understood and
shared by the plaintiff.
The decision appears to be correct. 22 There is no particular reason
to believe that the transfer of stock in a corporation of itself denotes
a termination of the interest of the former shareholders in its success,
or a willingness to guarantee its debts. This would seem to be particularly
true when the transfer is to the children of the guarantors. Whether
the plaintiff would have continued to extend credit to the corporation
without the guaranty of the defendants is a matter of speculation.
It must also be observed that in the case at hand, and in the cases
the court relied upon in deciding it, the sureties never directly notified
the creditor that they were unwilling to continue guaranteeing the future
debts of the principal obligor. Whether a verbal notice from the surety,
followed by some indication of the creditor that he recognizes the
unwillingness of the surety to guarantee future obligations, is sufficient
21. 473 So. 2d 108 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985).
22. The court relied upon two earlier cases as authority for its proposition: Magnolia
Petroleum Co. v. Harley, 13 So. 2d 84 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1943), and Bonura v. Christiana
Bros. Poultry Co., 336 So. 2d 881 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 339 So. 2d
II (La. 1976), 339 So. 2d 26 (La. 1976).
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to terminate a suretyship that otherwise requires written notice to do
so, was not before the courts. There is little reason, however, for a
court to hold that the suretyship continues in such a case. If clear and
convincing evidence is presented that the surety communicated his desire
to terminate the agreement and that the creditor acquiesced in or accepted
the communication, what more is required? After all, the creditor cannot
refuse the request, he can only require that it be put in writing., If he
chooses not to do so, that should end the matter.23 Furthermore, few
sureties are likely to demand a written release from the creditor or to
send an express written notice of termination if they receive a positive
indication from the creditor that he has received and understands the
revocation and does not expect to receive a written confirmation of it.
Perhaps the most important lesson to be drawn from the case is
that when one represents shareholders of closely-held corporations or
partners of partnerships who are disposing of all or even a substantial
part of their interest in the business, deliberate, explicit and careful
inquiry must be made as to the existence of contingent obligations
undertaken by the seller that might require cancellation or modification.24
Mortgages
A well known requirement for the availability of executory process
is that the mortgage upon which execution is sought must substantially
describe the note paraphed for identification with it. Any deviation
between the terms of the note presented by the plaintiff and that
described in the mortgage is fatal, even if the note bears the paraph
of the notary before whom the mortgage is executed. The rule itself is
23. This is not to say that the surety's burden of proof should not be great, or that
uncertainty or doubt should not be resolved against him. The purpose of a writing obviously
is to give certainty to the obligation. Having that means available to terminate his liability,
the surety should run the risk of any misunderstanding or ambiguity. The question is,
however, one of degree, not of substance. If there is no doubt that he communicated
his revocation and the creditor accepted it without the necessity of a confirming writing,
the revocation should be effective.
24. These may exist in a variety of forms other than express guarantees of the
corporate or partnership obligations. For example, contributions of property to the en-
terprise by the owners may have entailed the assumption of unreleased obligations of the
shareholders or partners. Direct guarantees, however, are probably the most common.
Utilities, service companies, suppliers of equipment and fixtures, wholesalers, franchisers,
key employees and even customers may require guarantees by shareholders or partners of
the current and future obligations of the enterprise. These kinds of obligations are
frequently overlooked or forgotten by the shareholders or partners at the time they sever
their connection with the business. Such persons are also sometimes unaware of the
continuing nature of their obligations, assuming, as the defendants in this case apparently
did, that since they have severed their connection with the busines, they are automatically
relieved of any responsibility for its future activities.
[Vol. 47
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not found in the Code of Civil Procedure, which merely requires that
the plaintiff submit "authentic evidence of: (1) The note, bond or other
instrument evidencing the obligation secured by the mortgage or privi-
lege." '25 The existence of the rule is obliquely given legislative recognition
by the last sentence of this article, which provides: "A variance between
the recitals of the note and of the mortgage regarding the obligation
to pay attorney's fees shall not preclude the use of executory process.' '26
The rule and its exception were both the subject of litigation this
year. In Bank of St. Charles v. Eris,27 the court held that executory
process was not available where the mortgage and note were both dated
September 25, 1981, but the notarial paraph on the note stated that it
was "in conformity with an act of collateral mortgage passed before
me this day September 30, 1981. "28
In Colonial Financial Services, Inc. v. Stewart, 29 the court reversed
a lower court's order enjoining issuance of executory process where there
was a discrepancy between the attorney's fees stipulated in the note
presented and their description in the mortgage, 0 and where the plaintiff
had acquired the note by an authentic act of assignment in which the
notary did not paraph the note. The court noted that Code of Civil
Procedure article 2635, referred to above, expressly provides that a
discrepancy in the attorney's fees stipulated in the note and the mortgage
does not preclude use of executory process. As to the lack of paraph
of the note with the assignment, the court observed that no statute or
jurisprudence required a notary to paraph a note with an authentic act
of assignment or endorsement. Moreover, after noting that Louisiana
Revised Statutes (La. R.S.) 9:5305 declares "notes . . . need not be
paraphed if the act of mortgage identifies them by date, number, amount
and date when payable," the court stated:
The courts have consistently interpreted this statute as authority
for the proposition that a note need not be paraphed if it can
be identified in all respects with the act of mortgage so that
there can be no doubt that the two instruments are in fact
related and that one stands as security for the other .... 1'
Although the court's decision may be correct as to the necessity for
a paraph of the note in the case of an assignment, its reliance upon
25. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2635.
26. Id.
27. 477 So. 2d 847 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985).
28. Id. at 849.
29. 481 So. 2d 186 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1985).
30. The opinion does not reveal the nature or extent of the discrepancy.
31. 481 So. 2d at 189 (citing Pepper v. Dunlap, 16 La. 163 (1840); Babin v. Winchester,
7 La. 460 (1834); U-Finish Homes, Inc. v. Lanzl, 202 So. 2d 339 (La. App. Ist Cir.
1967)).
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the authorities cited is certainly misplaced. La. R.S. 9:5305 is an ex-
ceptional statute, dealing exclusively with conventional mortgages that
secure several obligations. 32 The provision quoted obviously was intended
to negate any inference that mortgages of that kind are subject to the
provisions of Civil Code article 3384, which makes 'it "the duty" of
every notary before- whom a mortgage securing negotiable notes has
been passed to paraph the notes with the act of mortgage. The cases
relied upon as "interpreting the act in question" in fact have nothing
to do with either the act or executory process. Rather, they recognize
the well-settled principle that a failure to comply with the provisions of
article 3384 does not affect the intrinsic validity of the mortgage itself.
To be valid a mortgage need only be in writing," identify the property
encumbered,3' and state the amount of the debt it secures.", Conse-
quently, the failure of the notary to paraph the note as required of
him, or to comply with any requirement for the authenticity of the
mortgage, can only render the mortgage a private act, which is all the
law requires for its validity. Such a mortgage is certainly not in authentic
form and entitled to enforcement by executory process.
The jurisprudence is unvarying in its insistence that, for a debt in
negotiable form to be enforced by executory process, it must be ac-
curately described in the mortgage and carry the paraph of the notary
before whom the mortgage is executed.36 Nevertheless, it does not nec-
essarily follow that the court is incorrect in its conclusion. The source
of the "variance" rule is, as noted, not found directly in the Code of
Civil Procedure or the statutes. It is evidentiary. The plaintiff in an
executory proceeding is, in theory, proceeding upon a confessed judg-
ment. His right is limited to executing upon property securing the
obligation as to which the debtor has confessed judgment.37 When the
plaintiff presents that judgment for execution, he must accompany it
with evidence in authentic form demonstrating his right to assert the
32. The provisions have their genesis in Act 72 of 1914, the obvious purpose of
which was to permit the issuance of multiple or bond mortgages and the appointment
of a trustee for the benefit of the creditors.
33. La. Civ. Code art. 3305. Obviously, if a private writing will suffice, a lack of
paraph could hardly be said to affect its validity.
34. La. Civ. Code art. 3306.
35. La. Civ. Code art. 3309.
36. See Myrtle Grove Packing Co. v. Mones, 226 La. 287, 76 So. 2d 305 (1954),
and the cases cited therein.
37. "Executory proceedings are those . . . to enforce a mortgage or privilege . ..
evidenced by an authentic act importing a confession of judgment." La. Code Civ. P.
art. 2631. "An act . . . imports a confession of judgment when the obligor therein
acknowledges the obligation . . . and confesses judgment thereon . La. Code Civ.
P. art. 2632.
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judgment and seize the debtor's property. 8 The Code of Civil Procedure
describes what evidence is authentic or is to be considered authentic. It
also prescribes evidence that must be "included" in that which is pre-
sented by the petitioner. 9 The Code does not prescribe whether the
evidence presented by a particular petitioner is sufficient to establish his
right to proceed. When a note is presented, ostensibly securing a mort-
gage and paraphed for identification with it, and that note or the
declarations of the notary or parties in connection with it vary in some
material respect from each other, doubt is created as to whether the
note is in fact the one the mortgage secures. In an ordinary proceeding,
the plaintiff may cure this uncertainty by introducing evidence that a
mistake was made in the recitals of the parties and that the note is in
fact the one that the mortgagor executed and that the mortgage secures.
In an executory proceeding, however, no evidence may be introduced
that is not in authentic form. Furthermore, unless the petitioner intro-
duces such evidence (as he might, through an act of correction, or
certificate from the notary that one document or the other contains a
clerical error4), he simply has not sufficiently proven his case to warrant
issuing an ex parte order to seize and sell the debtor's property.
The case of Myrtle Grove Packing Co. v. Mones,4" contains an
excellent discussion of the rule, the reasons for its existence and the
authorities supporting it. The court in that case refused to direct issuance
of executory process where there was a discrepancy between the paraphed
note and its description in the mortgage. The court summarized its
reasons as follows: r
We still fail to see how the presence of the paraph cures the
discrepancy between the recitals of the note and the one described
in the act of sale and mortgage because it is essential that
evidence, other than authentic, must be introduced to establish
that the latter represents the same obligation upon which suit
is brought. For executory process to issue, all of the evidence
must be authentic. 42
This statement explains and confirms the holding of the court in
the Bank of St. Charles case. The court there held that, even though
38. This rule has a long history. See Chambliss v. Atchinson, 2 La. Ann. 488 (1847),
which also suggests that the notary's paraph may not be sacrosanct. See also McMahon,
The Historical Development of Executory Procedure in Louisiana, 32 Tul. L. Rev. 555
(1958), for an excellent summary of the development of the process and its Spanish
antecedents.
39. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 2635.
40. La. R. S. 13:4104 (1968) permits the notary to certify as to such an error on
the note or mortgage with authentic effect.
41. 226 La. 287, 76 So. 2d 305 (La. 1954).
42. Id. at 307.
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the note and mortgage conformed to each other, the statement of the
notary that the note was paraphed for identification with a mortgage
executed before him on a different day from the one presented would
dictate, in light of the strictness of proof required for executory process,
that some evidence be offered that the paraph was in error and that
the note was in fact the one secured by the mortgage. Even if one
postulates that a paraph is not necessary, the solemn declaration of the
notary that the note in question is secured by a mortgage bearing a
date different from the one attached to the petition should call for some
explanation. If it does, that explanation must be given by evidence in
authentic form.
Therefore, whether an act of assignment that transfers a mortgage
note must contain a reference to a paraph of the note depends, to some
extent, upon the terms of the documents. If, for example, the notary
states that he has paraphed the note, but the note presented does not
evidence such a paraph, some explanation should be forthcoming before
the court could justifiably conclude that the note presented is the note
that was assigned to the petitioner. On the other hand, the notary may
declare in the act of assignment that the assignor has presented the note
described in the mortgage, and mention its paraph and description. If,
in addition, the assignor acknowledges that the note presented is in fact
the one endorsed or transferred by him, then the presentation of the
note (the authenticity of which is affirmed by the mortgage and paraph),
endorsed in the manner described in the act of assignment, should
provide the court with sufficient evidence to order issuance of executory
process.
43
Somewhat the same observation may be made concerning Code of
Civil Procedure article 2635, which declares that a discrepancy between
the attorney's fees stipulated in the note and those described in the
mortgage does not preclude executory process. There is little doubt that
this article renders such a discrepancy insufficient to require introduction
of evidence that the note is the one described in the mortgage. Fur-
thermore, the article clearly justifies the ordering of executory process
43. It would seem to be indispensable for the notary to declare that the note has
been exhibited to him with sufficient particularity to satisfy the court that the person
signing the act of assignment was in fact the owner and holder of the note at that time.
See, e.g., Bornes v. Vernon, 64 So. 2d 18 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1953), refusing to accept
an act of release executed by one who only declared he was the "holder" of the note,
rather than "the holder and owner." The presence of the notary's paraph on the note
provides almost conclusive evidence that the note presented to him is the one secured by
the mortgage and upon which execution is sought. The case in question may be correct,
but sound practice would dictate, if only for the protection of the notary, that he paraph
any mortgage note presented to him for identification with any act he executes modifying
or affecting rights dependent upon it.
[Vol. 47
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by the court in Colonial Financial Services for the enforcement of the
principal and interest due on the note. But what of the attorney's fees?
Permitting executory process where there is a variance in the documents
"regarding the obligation to pay attorney's fees" says nothing about
which document, if either, is presumed to be correct. To enforce the
obligation to pay attorney's fees by executory process, the petitioner
must still prove his right to collect such fees, the amount secured by
the mortgage and the mortgagor's confession of judgment upon them.
Consider a mortgage in which the mortgagor confesses judgment
upon his note and the obligations it contains, including that regarding
attorney's fees, and also declares that such fees are secured by the
mortgage. Suppose, however, he also declares that the note provides
for attorney's fees of ten percent. Would the court be justified in issuing
a writ directing the sheriff to seize and sell the property to satisfy the
petitioner's claim for attorney's fees, if the note presented by the pe-
titioner, although paraphed for identification with the mortgage and
otherwise corresponding to it, in fact stipulates attorney's fees of 25
percent? The only evidence before the court is that an error exists with
respect to the fees. Without additional evidence as to the nature of the
error, is the court justified in concluding that either amount is correct?
The author suggests petitioner has not made his case for including the
fees in the description of the amount for which the property is to be
sold under the writ of seizure and sale. Nevertheless, this may not be
ultimately fatal to the plaintiff's case. It may be possible that he can
assert and prove his claim for the fees out of the proceeds in the
sheriff's hands after the sale, by a rule or motion directed to the sheriff."
There are cases, however, holding that a petitioner who prays for rec-
ognition of his mortgage in an ordinary action is not entitled to assert
it if the judgment does not recognize it. 41 Thus, the defendant can argue
that where the writ of seizure and sale does not authorize the sheriff
to satisfy the claim for attorney's fees, the petitioner is precluded from
recovering them until he establishes his right to them by an action for
a deficiency judgment. The answer to the problem is by no means clear.
Brian v. The Jock Shop, Inc. 6 concerns the intractable problem of
correlating the rules pertaining to the accessory nature of a mortgage
with its status as a real right, regulated by the laws of registry. The
44. The Code of Civil Procedure apparently only contemplates that third persons will
assert such claims by intervention, and a case can be made that insofar as the proceeds
of the sale by executory process is concerned, the petitioner would be limited to recovering
the amount which the writ directs the property be sold to satisfy. See La. Code Civ. P.
art. 2643.
45. See Houma Steel & Supply, Inc. v. Allied Towing Servs., Inc., 468 So. 2d 637
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1985), and cases cited therein.
46. 479 So. 2d 398 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 481 So. 2d 1349 (La. 1986).
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debt secured by a mortgage is not a real right and is obviously not
recorded. Consequently, its transfer or extinction cannot be determined
from the public records. Civil Code article 2645, which provides that
the "sale or transfer of a credit includes every thing which is an accessory
to the same; as . . . mortgages, ' 47 has been held to effect an implicit
assignment of the mortgage when the note it secures is negotiated. 4
More importantly, third persons dealing with the mortgaged property
are bound by such an assignment. As a result, the "mortgagee," who
at any given moment may modify, release, enforce or otherwise exercise
the rights granted by the mortgage, is the person entitled to enforce
the principal obligation which the mortgage secures, even though there
is nothing of record to reveal that person's identity.49 This causes dif-
ficulty in cases of releases, amendments or other modifications of the
mortgage, since third persons, finding such documents in the public
records, must independently determine that the person purporting to act
as the mortgagee was the creditor of the secured obligation. 0
A corollary to this problem is created when the holder of the
mortgage note executes an act modifying the mortgage, but negotiates
the note before recording the act. Is the new holder of the note bound
by the unrecorded act? It can be argued that he is on the grounds that
an assignee can enforce no greater rights than his assignor possessed.
Alternatively, it can be maintained that, although the assignee becomes
a party to the mortgage by virtue of the assignment, an act or release
or amendment to the mortgage is a different contract, which, because
it affects a real right, is ineffective as to him unless recorded. This
would preclude the person asserting that the assignor's rights were di-
minished by the release or amendment from introducing the agreement
into evidence against the assignee.
In Brian the plaintiff was a surety for a corporation's obligations
to the Fidelity bank. Plaintiff gave the bank a continuing guaranty
agreement in which he bound himself in solido with the corporation
for its debts to the bank "precisely as if the same hadbeen contracted
47. La. Civ. Code art. 2645.
48. A mortgage can, of course, secure any kind of obligation, but for pragmatic
reasons conventional obligations are almost invariably cast in negotiable form when mort-
gage security is desired, and for convenience it will be assumed the mortgage debt is
represented by a negotiable instrument.
49. The most obvious and notable consequences of this rule are the imposition of
liability upon the recorder for cancelling a mortgage without evidence that the person
granting the release is the holder of the note, and the rule permitting execution by
executory process only upon evidence that the petitioner is the holder of the note secured
by the mortgage.
50. It is safe to say this is one of the very few instances where a person may not
affirmatively rely upon the records as evidencing the ownership of real rights transferable
by agreement.
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and was due or owing" by him. Further, he bound himself to the terms
of any note of the debtor to the bank as "a party thereto."
The notes of the corporation to the bank were also secured by the
pledge of a collateral mortgage note, that was in turn secured by a
mortgage upon what was referred to as the Camelia Street property.
The property was owned by one of the shareholders of the corporation,
who was, not coincidentally, the brother-in-law of the plaintiff. The
brother-in-law had independently executed and pledged the mortgage
note and mortgage for the corporation's notes to the bank. When the
corporation defaulted on its notes to the bank, the plaintiff apparently
paid the bank under the guaranty agreement, and the bank assigned
him the corporation's notes, as well as the collateral mortgage note.
After the assignment, the plaintiff attempted to execute upon the
mortgage. The defendant sued to enjoin the action, alleging that, before
the corporation defaulted on its obligations, the bank had verbally
represented to a prospective purchaser of the Camelia Street property
that nothing was owed upon the collateral mortgage note, and that the
bank would release the mortgage upon request. The purchaser had in
fact thereafter bought the property in reliance upon those representations,
and later sold the property to the defendant, who was unaware that
the mortgage had not been released. No act of release was ever actually
executed or recorded, and it was upon the basis of the public records
doctrine that the plaintiff asserted his right to enforce the mortgage.
The lower court enjoined the plaintiff on the grounds the the bank,
and plaintiff as its successor, were estopped to assert the mortgage. The
first circuit agreed with the plaintiff that the question of estoppel was
not properly before the court, because the defendant had not expressly
pleaded it. It then held, however, that the release of the mortgage was
binding upon the bank and that the plaintiff could not raise the lack
of recordation, because he was a "party" to the "transaction" under
the terms of his guaranty agreement: "[Flor the purposes of the public
records doctrine, Brian by executing a continuing guaranty on the debt
of the Jock Shop, became a party to the note and mortgage by agreement
and as such is bound by all agreements whether or not they are re-
corded."'" The decision, although understandable, 52 is questionable if
not clearly wrong on both points. A verbal agreement to release a
mortgage, absent estoppel or confession, should be no more binding
than any other verbal agreement affecting a real right."
51. 479 So. 2d at 400.
52. The court was convinced that the plaintiff was aware that the bank did not
consider the mortgage binding, and that his brother-in-law (the mortgagor) sold the property
as being free of the mortgage.
53. The lower court had held the release binding upon grounds of estoppel. The
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The court's conclusion that the terms of the guaranty made the
surety "a party" to the mortgage and the note securing it also appears
to be erroneous. The corporation, whose debts he guaranteed, was not
a "party" to the mortgage and the mortgage note. The mortgage note
was executed by a third person and was secured by a mortgage upon
that third person's land. If the surety was, by virtue of his guaranty,
"a party to" the note, in what capacity was he made a party? Was he
maker? Payee? Endorser?5 4
This does not mean, however, that the decision is necessarily in-
correct. Support for the court's action can be found in a line of cases
holding that, while a mortgage note may be negotiable, the mortgage
securing it is not. Consequently, a person acquiring a mortgage note,
even as a holder in due course, only succeeds to the rights of the
transferor of the note by virtue of the tacit assignment granted by article
2645. This assignee acquires no greater rights to the mortgage than his
assignor possessed." As applied to the present case, the rule would mean
that the bank, having in fact released the mortgage, was no longer
entitled to enforce it and could assign no rights in it to the plaintiff.
Another line of cases, based upon the same principles, also indicates
that (absent some contractual agreement to the contrary) the bank, by
assigning the mortgage note (even "without recourse"), impliedly war-
rants the existence of the mortgage under the provisions of Civil Code
article 2505.56
South Louisiana Bank v. Miller, 7 held that a chattel mortgage
witnessed by only one witness and proven before the notary by the
affidavit of the witness was invalid as to third persons. Louisiana Revised
Statutes 9:5353 provides: "In order to affect third persons, every chattel
mortgage shall be by authentic act, or by private act, duly authenticated
in any manner provided by law." 58 The court went on to observe that
several Civil Code articles "clearly provide that both an authentic act
and an act under private signature require at least two witnesses." 5 9 The
court of appeal said this was erroneous, because the plaintiff in the injunction had not
pleaded estoppel. The court gave no reasons whatsoever for its holding that "lt]he release
of the mortgage by Fidelity [the bank], though not recorded, is effective between Fidelity,
Fortier [the mortagor] and Brian [the plaintiff] .... "
54. The court's conclusion would be equivalent to saying that if a third person had
pledged United States Bonds to secure the corporation's obligations, the plaintiff, as
surety, became a "party to" the bonds with the United States. This is a conclusion which
the writer (and I suspect the losing attorney) finds somewhat astounding.
55. See Adams v. Webster, 25 La. Ann. 117 (La. 1873).
56. See Lemoine v. City of Shreveport, 184 La. 221, 165 So. 873 (La. 1936), and
Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Cook, 121 So. 306 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1928).
57. 479 So. 2d 461 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1985).
58. La. R.S. 9:5353 (1981).
59. 479 So. 2d at 463 (emphasis in original).
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court also noted (by way of dicta) that "[aictual knowledge by a third
person of the existence of a recorded chattel mortgage dispenses with
the necessity of complying with statutory requirements." 6 The court
relied upon All State Credit Plan, Inc. v. Fournier,6' as authority for
this proposition. Fournier contains substantially the same statement (also
by way of dicta) relying, in turn, upon Southern Enterprises v. Foster,62
a Louisiana Supreme Court decision. In Southern Enterprises, the court
said that the requirements prescribed by the chattel mortgage regulations
then in effect were essential only to make the mortgage effective as to
"innocent third persons" without notice. Unfortunately, however, the
Chattel Mortgage Act 63 construed by the court in that case expressly
provided that the requirements for both authenticity and recordation
were necessary to "affect third persons without notice. '64 The act was
amended in 1944 (the source of the present provisions) to read: "in
order to affect third persons every chattel mortgage," etc. 65 Conse-
quently, the dicta by the court relative to lack of actual notice would
ordinarily not merit comment. A few years after enactment of the present
provision, however, the second circuit held that the 1944 revision was
not intended to change its substance, and that actual notice of a chattel
mortgage not only cured defects of form, but rendered lack of recor-
dation itself irrelevant.66
The court's conclusion in South Louisiana Bank that an act under
private signature requires two witnesses is also incorrect. The term "act
under private signature" is synonymous with "written act" and simply
refers to a writing signed by one or both of the parties. The most recent
revision of the Civil Code sets forth the requirements of an act under
private signature as follows: "An act under private signature need not
be written by the parties, but must be signed by them." '61
Although there were, and still are, references in the Civil Code to
witnesses to a private act, there is not, and never has been, any re-
quirement that such an act be witnessed to be valid. It cannot be said,
however, that the court was incorrect in rejecting the act in question
as not having been "authenticated" in a "manner provided by law."
The parties attempted to authenticate the mortgage by the affidavit of
the witness, as permitted by La. R.S. 13:3720, which provides that an
act may be made "self proving" by the affidavit of "one of the
60. Id. n.4.
61. 175 So. 2d 707 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1965).
62. 203 La. 133, 13 So. 2d 491 (La. 1943).
63. 1918 La. Acts No. 198, § 2, as amended by 1936 La. Acts No. 174.
64. Id.
65. 1944 La. Acts No. 172.
66. First Nat'l Bank v. Lawrence, 207 So. 2d 907 (La. App. 2d. Cir. 1968).
67. La. Civ. Code art. 1837.
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witnesses" to the act stating that the witness saw the "other witness"
and parties execute the same. The section obviously contemplates there
are two or more witnesses to the act, and its provisions are probably
unavailable where the act has only one witness. Nevertheless, there are
a number of other ways of authenticating documents that do not con-
template or require witnesses to the basic act. For example, article 1836
of the Civil Code allows authentication by the acknowledgement of a
party before a notary and two witnesses. La. R.S. 35:511 provides an
alternative method of acknowledgement by permitting a party to ac-
knowledge his signature before a notary alone. The decision in question
would render such acknowledgements invalid unless the original act also
was witnessed by two witnesses. Apart from the absence of any positive
provision of law mandating such witnesses, it is difficult to see what
value they would have, since the law declares a later acknowledgement
by the parties in a form that does not involve those witnesses sufficient
to give the act "authenticity" and make it self-proving.
The Private Works Act
In Morgan v. Audobon Construction Co.," the court held that a
statement of claim or privilege of a subcontractor signed "Yantley
Erectors, Inc by: Wayne Morgan," was valid, although "Yantly Erec-
tors" was a trade name under which Mr. Morgan did business. The
Private Works Act requires that the statement of claim be signed by
the person asserting the same "or his representative." ' 69 The comments
to that section say:
The purpose of the statement . . . is to give notice to the owner
(and contractor) of the existence of the claim and to give notice
to persons who may deal with the owner that a privilege is
claimed on the property. . . . Technical defects in the notice
should not defeat the claim as long as the notice is adequate
to serve the purposes intended. 0
The court found that the comments were supported by Central
Lumber Co. v. Douglas,7 and Alside Supply Co. v. Gervais,72 and held
that since there was no evidence that the contract or surety were misled
or did not in fact know of the claim, the notice was sufficient.
The decision appears to be correct. Insofar as the owner is concerned,
the recordation of the notice is almost irrelevant, since the act requires
68. 485 So. 2d 529 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986).
69. La. R.S. 9:4822 E(2) (1983).
70. Official Comments to La. R.S. 9:4822 (1983).
71. 12 La. App. 680, 127 So. 43 (2d Cir. 1930).
72. 303 So. 2d 584 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
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delivery of a copy of the statement to the owner. As far as the contractor
is concerned, the recordation has nothing to do with the establishment
of a real right or the protection of third persons relying upon an
independent examination of the records. The function of notice to the
contractor is simply to protect him in paying his subcontractors and to
establish a method by which he can be assured that the subcontractors
have satisfied those persons who can claim the protection of the act.
The matter is, as to the contractor, exclusively one of notice. He has
no interest in the land, nor is he acquiring any interest in it. There is
thus no reason to apply the ordinarily rather strict rules of construction
developed to protect persons relying upon the public records pertaining
to immovables and to give integrity to those records.
C.J. Richard Lumber Co. v. Melancon," held that, for purposes
of the Private Works Act, a supplier of materials may include the sales
taxes in the price of the materials. Again, this seems to be correct. The
act gives a privilege to the seller of goods "for the price" of the
materials.74 The sales tax act requires a seller to "add the amount of
the tax, to the sale price or charges, which shall be a debt from the
purchaser or consumer to the dealer, until paid."" It can hardly be
said that the court was unjustified in reading the word "price" in the
Private Works Act in pari materia with the sales tax. Certainly, the
purpose of both acts is better served by the decision.
The act gives privileges to: "contractors" (and "subcontractors"),
for "the price of their work"; "laborers" and "employees," for the
"price of work performed at the job site"; "sellers," for the "price
of movables . . . that become component parts of the immovable ...;
and "lessors," for the "rent of movables used at the site .. . leased
by a written contract." After noting the specific and careful language
used by these provisions of the act in defining the persons given rights
under it, and the kinds of obligations they may assert, the court in
Cirlot Co. v. Lake Forest, Inc.7 6 rejected the claim of a person who
entered into a contract "to supply equipment and drivers" to a con-
tractor, to be directed by the latter. The court concluded the contract
was neither one of employment nor the lease of movables, but was
instead an innominate one that did not fall within any of the categories
protected by the act.
'The decision is probably correct, although there is little logic in
excluding contracts of the type described from the protection of the
73. 476 So. 2d 1018 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985).
74. La. R.S. 9:4801 (1983).
75. La. R.S. 47:304 (e) (Supp. 1986).
76. 475 So. 2d 799 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985).
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act. Certainly, the same arrangement could have been made in such a
manner as to come within the terms of the act. On the other hand,
the obvious purpose of the act is to give greater certainty to the status
of persons involved in the construction process and to contractors,
sureties, owners, lenders and others who must deal with the intricate
contractual and property relationships involved in modem construction
projects. There can be little doubt, reading the act as a whole, that the
language of the classifications was intended to be both technical and
precise. The penalty one usually pays for such precision is a certain
degree of arbitrariness and unfairness arising from the inability to predict
the multitude of contractual arrangements that modern industry may
develop to take advantage of changing technology and economic con-
ditions.
